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CASE NOTES
(2) neither party made any report of the option in his income tax re-
turns in the year the option was granted.
The fact that the disposal value of the option was speculative, coupled
with the failure of both the employer and employee to claim any deduc-
tion in their income tax returns for the value of the stock when given,
was sufficient for the court to distinguish the Van Dusen case from the
instant case.
The only authority cited for the holding in the instant case was the
dicta contained in the case of Connnissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Smith.15 Although the court in that case held that the compensation was
not confined to the mere delivery of an option of no value, but included
the compensation obtainable by the exercise of the option given for that
purpose, the court further stated:
When the option price is less than the market price of the property for the
purchase of which the option is given, it may have present value and may be
found to be itself compensation for services rendered.1
It is upon this statement that the instant court relies.
This case is significant because it is the first to hold that the value of
the option, when granted, is the amount to be reported as income. How-
ever, the possibility of other courts following this precedent is slight
because none seem to favor the taxpayer as much as the instant court, and
since the decisions in such cases rest on the facts involved, courts will
have little trouble distinguishing other cases from the instant case.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-HEART ATTACK
HELD WITHIN STATUTE
The plaintiff was a police captain whose duties were mainly supervisory.
On the day in question, plaintiff led an emergency search for a fugitive,
an activity unusual to the normal performance of his duties. Because of
the heavy strain of walking three hours over rugged terrain and the
digging out of his car, which had become stuck in the sand, the plain-
tiff suffered a heart attack and was permanently disabled. Action was
brought to recover compensation. The court allowed the claim, holding
that the disability was a result of strain on the heart due to unusual
exertion and was an "accident arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.'
Hathaway v. New Mexico State Police, 57 N.M. 747, 263 P. 2d 690
(1953).
Generally, when the courts speak of "accident" as used in Workmen's
Compensation Acts, they are construing the term liberally and in its
15 324 U.S. 177 (1945).
16 Ibid., at 181. 1 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1941 Comp. §§ 57-902.
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popular sense, finding it to mean "any mishap or untoward event ' 2 which
is "produced by something unforeseen, unexpected and unavoidable in
the act which precedes the injury."'3 The courts are apparently satisfied
with this early construction since it has remained constant throughout
the years. Indicative of the early decisions on this point is the case of
United States Mutual Accident Ass'n. v. Barry4 where the court said:
If a result is such as follows from ordinary means voluntarily employed in a
not unusual or unexpected way, . . . it cannot be called a result effected by
accidental means; but if in the act which precedes the injury something un-
foreseen, unexpected, unusual, occurs, which produces the injury, then the
injury has resulted . . . through accidental means.5
It was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an
insurer against all accidental injuries which might occur to an employee
while in the course of employment. In order for an accident to be com-
pensable under the Act, there must be a causal connection; it must be
reasonably connected with the employment., In Dreyfus & Co. v. Meade7
the court stated that the words "arising out of" and "in the course of"
have to be used conjunctively, and to satisfy the statute both condi-
tions have to occur. It is not enough that the accident occur in the
course of employment, but the causative danger must also arise from
it. The words "arising out of" refer to the origin of the accident and
describe its character, while "in the course of" refers to the time, place,
and circumstances under which the accident has taken place. Whether
the employee was in the sphere of his duty when the accident occurred
is very important in determining whether recovery will be allowed. 8
There are two basic principles which the courts follow in deciding
the heart cases. The first is that when death or a disabling heart injury
results from unusual strain or exertion in the ordinary course of em-
ployment, the victim shall be compensated. 9 In Margolies v. Crawford
Clothes'0 the court followed this principle and allowed recovery to a
salesman who had suffered a disabling heart attack while in the process
of moving several hundred overcoats onto the sales floor. The court was
of the opinion that even though this salesman had previously moved
other garments in much smaller quantities when called upon to do so,
2 Stacey Bros. Gas Const. Co. v. Massey, 92 Ind. App. 348, 175 N.E. 368 (1931).
3 Crews v. Moseley Bros., 148 Va. 125, 127, 138 S.E. 494, 496 (1927).
4 131 U.S. 100 (1889).
5 Ibid., at 109.
6 Patterson v. S. S. Thompson, Inc., 12 N.J. Misc. 4, 169 Ad. 338 (S. Ct., 1933).
7 142 Va. 567, 129 S.E. 336 (1925).
8 Porter v. Industrial Commission, 352 111. 392, 186 N.E. 110 (1933).
9 Hill v. Thomas S. Gassner Co., 124 Pa. Super. 217, 188 Atl. 382 (1936).
10 24 N.J. Super. 598, 95 A. 2d 413 (1953).
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the fact remained that his remuneration was dependent on commission
received while on the sales floor. The court concluded that the task
undertaken was unusual to the type of work there involved.
In some cases, the employer has contended that recovery should not be
allowed where the employee had already been doing strenuous work.
The court in Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Franken" pointed out
that this contention has no merit. It was there held that whether the work
being done was "light" or "heavy" had no place in the consideration of a
claimant's right to recover. The problem still resolves around the unusual-
ness of the work at the time the accident occurred. This rule has been
relaxed somewhat by the New York Courts. In the case of Masse v. James
H. Robinson Co.,1 2 plaintiff had long been doing physically hard work.
During the particular week in question, the plaintiff was engaged in un-
usually strenuous work and as a result suffered a heart attack. It was
pointed out, however, that the attack did not occur until Saturday, plain-
tiff's day off, and that there was no "extraordinary or catastrophic inci-
dent" to which the attack could be traced. The court, in allowing recov-
ery, stated that, "whether the incident was an accident is determined not
by legal definition but by the common sense view point of the average
man."'13 The rule set forth in the Masse case has been limited to some
extent by the decision in Devo v. Village of Piermont Inc.14 In that case,
plaintiff, a policeman, was exposed to exceptionally bad weather while
directing traffic. This was not an unusual incident in his normal day's
work. Four days later the plaintiff lost the use of his arm. At no time did
plaintiff suspect an injury before the actual "loss of use" occurred, yet
medical testimony traced it to the day in question. Recovery was denied.
After recognizing that the trend in New York cases is to relax the rule
which requires that the work be unusual, and allow recovery where the
attack occurred from exertion of work, the court stated that the "com-
mon sense" interpretation of what constitutes an accident should not be
extended to "fringe cases" where there is no single incident which can be
regarded as an accident. What cases fall within the "fringe" area is a
matter of court interpretation, and might mean, depending on the future
outlook of the courts, either a complete reversal of the present trend or
only a precedent for future use when the lower courts "go too far."
A few courts which interpret their statutes literally hold that in order
for an accident to be compensable it must happen suddenly, violently,
and produce at the time an injury to the physical structure of the
11 126 Ohio St. 299, 185 N.E. 199 (1933).
12 301 N.Y. 34, 92 N.E. 2d 56 (1950).
13 Ibid., at 34 and 57.
14 283 App. Div. 67, 126 N.Y.S. 2d 523 (1953).
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body.15 In Costly v. City of Eveleth, 0 the deceased, a member of the
city fire department, suffered chill and exposure while attending a fire.
Shortly thereafter, he developed pneumonia and died. The court held that
this was not compensable under the statutory definition of accident since
there was no proof of "injury to the physical structure of the body."
An Illinois court in Marsh v. Industrial Commission17 attempted to
follow a somewhat similar view to that set down in the Costly case. The
employee in the Marsh case was apparently healthy, but after lifting a
heavy weight he became sick and disabled. The cause of his illness was
diagnosed as a fibrillating heart (a heart not beating in rhythm). Medical
testimony was introduced to show that such exertion would aggravate an
existing heart condition but would have no effect on a normal heart. The
court did not allow compensation, laying stress upon the fact that
there must be external evidence of the accident. In reversing the lower
court, the Supreme Court stated:
It is well settled the Workmen's Compensation Act is not limited in its
application to healthy employees. Where one sustains an accidental injury
which aggravates a diseased condition, or where, in performance of his duties
and as a result thereof, he is suddenly disabled, an accidental injury is sustained
even though the result would not have obtained had the employee been in
normal health.'
8
The Marsh case, then, settles the question of whether an employee can
recover compensation where he had a pre-existing heart disease. But as
pointed out in the case of O'Neil v. W. R. Spencer Grocer Co.,19 the
Act is not intended to cover aggravation of a pre-existing disease without
an "accident" or "fortuitous event." In that case, the plaintiff was a sales-
man whose normal day's work involved a considerable amount of driving.
On the particular day in question, the plaintiff was operating his car in a
heavy snow when he suffered a heart attack. The court refused recovery,
stating that driving through a heavy snow is not such an unusual event as
to amount to an "accident." The plaintiff's cardiac failure was viewed as
being due to a disease of life to which everyone is exposed.
The second principle which the courts follow in heart cases is that
recovery is allowable even though the accident was caused by complain-
ants pre-existing heart disease. 20 The most common argument against re-
covery in such cases has been that since the accident was precipitated by
15 Costly v. City of Eveleth, 173 Minn. 564, 218 N.W. 126 (1928); Blair v. Omaha
Ice and Cold Storage Co., 102 Neb. 16, 165 N.W. 893 (1917).
10 173 Minn. 564, 218 N.W. 126 (1928).
17 386 Il. 11, 53 N.E. 2d 459 (1944).
18 Ibid., at 13 and 460.
19 316 Mich. 320, 25 N.W. 2d 213 (1946).
20 Christensen v. Dysart, 42 N.M. 107, 76 P. 2d 1 (1938).
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the plaintiff's heart disease, it did not "arise out of" employment, and
therefore, is not compensable. However, the courts adhering to this argu-
ment are in the minority.
21
In the case of Savage v. St. Aeden's Church,22 the employee was found
dead in a room where he was preparing to paint. Evidence was introduced
establishing that death resulted from a skull fracture suffered as a conse-
quence of a fall believed to have been precipitated by a heart attack. In
allowing recovery, the court pointed out that an injury suffered during
employment does not fail being one which "arises out of" employment
merely because some infirmity resulting from a disease originally set in
action the final proximate cause of the injury.
There have been many heart cases so holding, but the greatest number
of cases adhering to this principle involve diseases other than those of the
heart.23 The court in the case of Rockford Hotel Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission24 allowed recovery to a workman who fell into a pit of hot cinders
and died shortly thereafter. The cause of the fall was traced to an epilep-
tic fit. It was urged that the seizure was the direct cause of the injury and
that it therefore did not "arise out of" his employment. After carefully
studying the question, the court stated:
Some cases hold that, where an employee is seized with a fit and falls to his
death, the employer is not liable, because the injury did not arise out of the
employment.., but a majority of the courts, American and English, hold that,
if the injury was due to the fall, the employer is liable, even though the fall
was caused by a pre-existing idiopathic condition. 25
In all of these cases the courts have been careful to point out that it is not
because of the heart disease or previous ailment that they are allowing
recovery but that in each case it has been proved that the plaintiff suf-
fered disability or death from the fall or other accident, even though the
accident was precipitated by the heart disease or previous ailment.
It seems apparent, from the forgoing cases, that precedent set in other
jurisdictions means very little. Although the courts have the aforemen-
tioned principles to guide them, what the outcome will be in any jurisdic-
tion, even where the facts are identical, depends to a large extent on the
interpretation placed on the particular Workmen's Compensation Act
there involved. If the courts construe it liberally, complainant is com-
pensated; if not, recovery is denied.
21 Pierce v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 42 Ariz. 436, 26 P. 2d 1017 (1933); Stombough v.
Peerless Wire Fence Co., 198 Mich. 445, 164 N.W. 537 (1917); McNamara v. Indus-
trial Accident Commission, 130 Cal. App. 284, 20 P. 2d 53 (1933).
22 122 Conn. 343, 189 AtI. 599 (1937).
23 New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Hoage, 62 F. 2d 468 (App. D.C., 1932); Van
Watermeuller v. Industrial Commission, 343 I1. 73, 174 N.E. 846 (1931); Rockford
Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 300 Ill. 87, 132 N.E. 759 (1921).
24 300 Ii. 87, 132 N.E. 759 (1921). 25 Ibid., at 89 and 760.
